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Casenote

King Solomon: Did the Supreme Court Make
a Wise Decision in Upholding the Solomon
Amendment in Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.?

In a unanimous decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
InstitutionalRights, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment.2 The Court ruled that
under the Solomon Amendment, military recruiters must be given the
same access as nonmilitary recruiters on university campuses.3 The
Court's holding clarified three First Amendment 4 tangential freedom
issues: (1) what is and what is not expressive conduct; (2) what
constitutes compelled speech; and (3) what is meant by expressive
association.

1. 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1301 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which all the other Justices joined, except Alito, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case).
2. Id. at 1313; 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
3. Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
4.

U.S. CONST. amend I.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In pursuit of their mission to "promote free thought and [to] inculcate
principles ofjustice, law schools across the country have sought to create
supportive, inclusive, and tolerant learning environments for their
students."' To create and maintain this environment, the Association
of American Law Schools ("AALS") and its member schools believe that
discrimination, in any form, cannot and should not, be tolerated.6 "As
part of this effort to eliminate discrimination in legal education, AALS
has required its members to avoid discrimination on the basis of race or
color since 1951, and on the basis of sex since 1970."' In addition,
starting in the 1970s, numerous law schools across the country began to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Because this
trend grew in the ensuing years, in 1990 the AALS amended its bylaws
to require all member schools to include sexual orientation in their
nondiscrimination policies.' Today, all AALS members have policies that
"ban discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, gender, religion,
age, disability, veteran status-and sexual orientation."9
Because there is no longer a draft in the United States, Congress
requires the military to "conduct intensive recruiting campaigns" to
encourage military enlistments."0 Today, the military recruits throughout the country at numerous colleges and universities in order to satisfy
its needs-law schools included. In spite of the military's recruiting
efforts, in 1993 Congress passed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue
Policy."" Commonly referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," this law
provides that the military may discharge any service member who
"engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a
homosexual act" or "stated that he or she is a homosexual." 2 As a
consequence of the enactment of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the military has
not been able to comply with the nondiscrimination policies of AALS law
schools, and as such, many law schools effectively banned military

5. Brief for AALS as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152).
6.
7.

Id.
Id.

8. Id. at 4.
9. Brief for American Association of University Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 9, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No.

04-1152).
10. 10 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (2000).
11. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
§ 571(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1547, 1670 (1993) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000)).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
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recruiters from on-campus recruiting. 3 In direct response to these
actions, in 1994 Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment, which at
the time, specified that "[n]o funds available to the Department of
Defense may be provided ... to any institution of higher education that
has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the Secretary of
Defense from obtaining for military recruiting purposes ... entry to
campuses or access to students on campuses."' 4 During debate on the
legislation, Representative Solomon described the need for the Amendment as necessary because "'[riecruiting is the key to our all-volunteer
Recruiters have been able to enlist such promising
military forces ....
volunteers ... by going into high schools and colleges and informing
young people of the increased opportunities that a military tour or career
can provide.'"' 5
The Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. ("FAIR") is an
association composed of various law schools and law faculties that have6
all adopted antidiscrimination policies that include sexual orientation.
The organization's mission is to "'promote academic freedom, support
educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate the
rights of institutions of higher education.'"'' In 2003 FAIR sought a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the unamended
version of the Solomon Amendment. FAIR claimed that the First
Amendment rights of speech and association of its member law schools
had been violated. The district court denied the preliminary injunction
because FAIR had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the
merits. The court's decision was based in part on its conclusion that
military recruiting is conduct, not speech.'" More specifically, the
district court found that the "inclusion 'of an unwanted periodic visitor'
did not 'significantly affect the law schools' ability to express their
particular message or viewpoint.'"' 9
However, in rejecting FAIR's First Amendment claims, the district
court expressed concern over the Department of Defense's ("DOD")
assertion that the Solomon Amendment requires law schools to give
military recruiters the same access that all other recruiters receive.2 °

13. Brief for AALS, supra note 5, at 6-7.
14. Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 3, Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, 126 S. Ct.
1297 (No. 04-1152) (quoting National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub.
L. No. 103-337, § 558, 108 Stat. 2776).
15. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 4 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 16,860 (1996)).
16. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1302.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1303.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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In response to this concern, Congress amended the Solomon Amendment
in 2004 to codify the DOD's interpretation that law schools must
"'provide military recruiters access to students that is at least equal in
21
quality and scope to the access provided other potential employers.'
The amendment now withholds "federal funds from institutions that did
not afford equal access." 22 This new statutory provision requires the
career services offices of law schools to distribute recruiting catalogues,
post job bulletins, make appointments for students, and allow military
recruiters to attend job fairs.23
Today, the Solomon Amendment provides in pertinent part:
(b) Denial of funds for preventing military recruiting on campus. No
funds described in subsection (d)(2) may be provided by contract or by
grant to an institution of higher education (including any subelement
of such institution) if the Secretary of Defense determines that that
institution (or any subelement of that institution) has a policy or
practice (regardless of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in
effect prevents(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of Homeland
Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to students ... on
campuses, for purposes of military recruiting... ; or
(2) access by military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting
to... information pertaining to students...24 enrolled at that institution (or any subelement of that institution).
FAIR appealed the decision of the district court on the grounds that
the newly amended Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional for the
same reasons that the previous version was unconstitutional.2 5 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, ordering the
district court to issue the preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of the Solomon Amendment. 26 The Third Circuit held that the Solomon
Amendment was unconstitutional in that it violated the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine "because it forced a law school to choose between
surrendering First Amendment rights and losing federal funding for its
27
university."

21. Id. at 1303-04.
22. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 5-6.
23. Brief for Respondent at 1, Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 126 S.
Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
25. Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1304.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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In rejecting the government's argument that the Solomon Amendment
should be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit
viewed the Solomon Amendment to be subject to strict scrutiny on two
grounds.2 8 First, the court concluded that the Solomon Amendment
directly burdened the law schools' First Amendment rights of expressive
association.29 In the court's opinion, "the presence of military recruiters
on campus would force law schools to send a message that they accept30
discrimination against homosexuals as a legitimate form of behavior."
Second, the court concluded that the Solomon Amendment "implicates
the compelled speech doctrine because it forces laws schools to propagate, accommodate, and subsidize a message regarding the service of
31
The court
homosexuals in the military with which they disagree."
further reasoned that "the government had failed to establish that there
are no alternative means for effective recruitment of military personnel
32
that would be less restrictive than the Solomon Amendment."
Additionally, the court held that a denial of equal access to military
recruiters was speech rather than expressive conduct, but that even "'if
the regulated activities were properly treated as expressive conduct
the Solomon Amendment was also unconstitutional
rather than speech,
33
O'Brien.'"
under
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the Solomon Amendment violated law schools' freedoms of
34
speech and association under the First Amendment.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech."" "The essence of
that protection is that Congress may not regulate speech except in cases
of extraordinary need ...."s The First Amendment "embodies an
overarching commitment to protect speech from government regulation
through close judicial scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Constitution's
constraints, but without imposing judicial formulas so rigid that they

28. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F. 3d 219, 229-30 (3d
Cir. 2004).
29. Id. at 230-35.
30. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 10.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1302.
34. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 544 U.S. 1017 (2005).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. Denver Area Educ. Telcomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996).
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become a straitjacket that disables government from responding to
serious problems." 7 As that is the case, the Solomon Amendment has
been surrounded by several First Amendment concerns. In enacting the
Solomon Amendment, Congress used its Spending Clause power, which
gives Congress the power to place conditions on the grant of federal
funds.3" However, the power of Congress to place conditions on funding
is limited by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which is a
principle fashioned by the Court that provides that the government "may
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech."39
"Under th[eI Court's precedents, a funding condition violates the First
Amendment when [it is] aimed at expression wholly unrelated to the
purposes for which funding is given."40 In other words, the government
cannot limit speech by placing a "condition on the recipient of a subsidy
rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside
the scope of the federally funded program."41 In light of this consideration, First Amendment issues of expressive conduct, compelled speech,
and expressive association must be examined.
A.

Cases Involving Expressive Conduct

Because groups and individuals often express themselves through
symbols and conduct other than words, the Court has often had to
determine whether certain expression was speech or conduct. In Spence
v. Washington,4 2 the Court considered whether a defendant's expressive
conduct should be regarded as communicative.43 There, the defendant
had taped a large peace symbol to an American flag and displayed it
outside his home. Under a Washington state law, he was convicted of
affixing a symbol to the American flag." The Court reversed the
conviction and held that the expression was protected under the First
Amendment.4" The Court reasoned that there was "an intent to
convey" a specific message and "in the surrounding circumstances" there
was a great likelihood that "the message would be understood by those

37.
38.
(2006).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 741.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
Brief for AAUP, supra note 9, at 5.
Id. at 5-6 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).
418 U.S. 405 (1974).
Id. at 409-10.
Id. at 405-06
Id. at 406.
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who viewed it."46 These two factors continue to be used by courts in
analyzing whether expressive conduct is speech under the First
Amendment.47
In United States v. O'Brien," the Court held that not all conduct that
communicates receives strict scrutiny review under the First Amendment.49 At the time of the Vietnam War, federal law prohibited the
destruction or alteration of draft cards.5 ° The defendant had burned
his "Selective Service registration certificates" in front of a large crowd
at a courthouse and was convicted. 5 On appeal, the defendant argued
that his act of burning his draft card was "symbolic speech" because "the
freedom of expression which the First Amendment guarantees includes
all modes of 'communication of ideas by conduct,' and that his conduct
[was] within this definition because he did it in 'demonstration against
the war and against the draft.'"52 The Court disagreed and held that
the statute regulated conduct and that the effect on the symbolic speech
was only incidental.5" The Court reasoned that it could not "accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea." 4 The Court stated that "when speech and nonspeech
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."55 The
Court articulated the standard four-part test for intermediate scrutiny,
which upholds a governmental regulation if(1) it is within the "constitutional power" of the government; (2) it furthers a substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is not related to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction is no greater
than necessary to further the interest.56
The test articulated in O'Brien is the current standard for expressive
conduct cases and was applied in Texas v. Johnson. 7 There, Texas
state law prohibited the destruction of the American flag. While

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 410-11.
See, e.g., Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004).
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 376-77.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 377.
491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989).
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protesting at the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, the
defendant burned an American flag and was later convicted of flag
desecration. 8 On appeal, the Court considered whether the act of flag
burning was expressive conduct, which would provide the defendant
First Amendment protection.5 9 The Court noted that "[iun deciding
whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements
to bring the First Amendment into play, [the issue is] whether '[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether]
the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it.'"'6
The Court reasoned that because the context of
expression is so important, the flag burning was a protected form of
expression under the First Amendment. 6'
B.

Cases Involving Government Compelled Speech
Just as the government can infringe upon the freedom of speech by
restricting speech, so too can it infringe upon freedom of speech by
compelling speech. The Court has found "impermissible compelled
speech in three categories of government action."62
These three
categories of government action are (1) government compelled speech; (2)
government compelled accommodation of speech; and (3) government
compelled subsidization of speech. 3 The doctrine of compelled speech
states that the government cannot force groups or individuals to express
certain ideas, messages, beliefs, or ideologies against their will." In
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,5 the Court
summed up this doctrine: "Ifthere is any fixed star in our constitutional

58. Id. at 399-400.
59. Id. at 402-04.
60. Id. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11).
61. Id. at 420. The Court stated, "We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its
desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents."
Id.
62. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 235-36
(2004).
63. Id. at 236; see, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(propagation); Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
581 (1995) (accommodation); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001)
(subsidization).
64. See United Foods,Inc., 533 U.S. at 410 (stating that "Ulust as the First Amendment
may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the
government from compelling individuals to express certain views.... ."); Turner Broad. Sys.
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (stating that "[alt the heart of the First Amendment
lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.").
65. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."66 In
Barnette the Court held that a state law requiring schoolchildren to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.6 7 Since Barnette, the Court has struck down
many laws compelling certain types of compelled speech. For example,
in Wooley v. Maynard,"8 the Court struck down a state law that
required "noncommercial vehicles [to] bear license plates embossed with
the [New Hampshire] state motto, 'Live Free or Die. ' " 9 In Wooley the
Court stated that "the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment... includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all."7 °
But the Court has distinguished cases such as Barnette and Wooley
(which were situations where individuals were compelled to speak the
government's message) from other cases involving situations where the
government forced a speaker to "host or accommodate another speaker's
message."7 Such a situation arose in Hurley v.Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,72 where the Court considered the
issue of whether a state law violated a parade sponsor's First Amendment rights by requiring the sponsor to include among the marchers an
organization imparting a message that the sponsor did not wish to
convey.73 The Court noted that because parades were a form of
expression, the "speaker ha[d] the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message," and thus, the speaker who organized the parade could
exclude any message the speaker did not like.74 The Court emphasized
that a speaker "has the right to tailor the speech" and that this tailoring
applies to "expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement ... [and] to

statements of fact [that] the speaker would rather avoid."75
This reasoning has also been applied in other contexts. In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,7" the Court struck down a Florida
state law that granted political candidates a right to reply to criticism

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 642.
Id.
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Id. at 707, 717.
Id. at 714.
Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1309.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 573.
Id.
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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and attacks on their records by newspapers." The Court recognized
that under the First Amendment the government cannot tell a newspaper "what it can print and what it cannot." 78 In particular, the Court
noted that the Florida law had the effect of "taking up space that could
be devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to
print."79 Likewise, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utility
Commission of California,° the Court struck down a state agency's
order for a utility company, which regularly included a newsletter in its
billing envelope, to also include a third-party newsletter.8' The Court
referenced Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo and concluded that the
compelled inclusion of a third-party newsletter would require the utility
to associate with speech that it may disagree with. 2
C.

Cases Involving Freedom of Association

The right of expressive association is the "right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends."" The Court has long
recognized that the corollary to the right of freedom of association is the
right of "freedom not to associate." 4 In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,85 the Court held that there is "no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire." 6
At issue in Roberts was a challenge to a state law that prohibited private
discrimination based on traits such as gender, and the Jaycees claimed
they had a right to exclude women from their group.87 Particularly
significant was the Court's assertion that the freedom of expressive
association can be infringed when "justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms." 8 Thus, the freedom of expressive association
is not absolute.

77. Id. at 258.
78. Id. at 255-56.
79. Id. at 256.
80. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
81. Id. at 5-7.
82. Id. at 9-12.
83. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
84. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
85. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
86. Id. at 623.
87. Id. at 612.
88. Id. at 623.
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In fact, the Court has noted that the freedom of association protects
a group's right to discriminate only if it is an intimate association or
where discrimination is integral to express activity.8 9 The most recent
application of these principles comes from Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,9 ° where the Court held that freedom of association allows the Boy
Scouts to exclude gay scoutmasters in violation of a state's antidiscrimination statute. 9' The Boy Scouts argued that their expressive message
was anti-gay, and that their message was undermined by the forced
inclusion of gays.9 2 In determining whether a group gets protection,
the Court first must determine whether it is engaged in "expressive
association," which gives rise to strict scrutiny review.93 The Court
ruled that the Boy Scouts were engaged in expressive association
because they wanted to "instill values in young people" and they sought
to do this "by having its adult leaders spend time with the youth
members, instructing and engaging them in activities like camping,
archery, and fishing."94 Although there was not an anti-gay message
in any Boy Scout publication or mission statement, the Court deemed
this non-determinative because an organization
does not need to
95
"trumpet its views from the housetops."
If a group is deemed to be engaged in expressive conduct, the second
consideration for the Court in determining whether a group merits
protection is whether stopping the organization from discriminating
would undermine its message.96 The Court concluded that the Boy
Scouts's message would be undermined, and the Court emphasized that
it will give "deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression. " 97 If these two considerations are met, then an association's
membership decisions will not be constitutionally regulated unless the
regulation of the membership decision "serve[s] compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. " "

89. See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980);
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73.
90. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
91. Id. at 661.
92. Id. at 647-48.
93. See id. at 648-49; Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 23031.
94. Dale, 530 U.S. at 649.
95. Id. at 656.
96. Id. at 648.
97. Id. at 653.
98. Id. at 648.
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In summary, the Solomon Amendment implicates three significant
First Amendment issues: (1) what is and is not expressive conduct; (2)
what constitutes government compelled speech; and (3) what is meant
by expressive association. First, before Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
& InstitutionalRights, Inc.," in determining expressive conduct claims,
the Court considered if the conduct was meant to convey a message and
if there was a substantial likelihood that the message would be
understood by those who saw it. 1°0 Second, as to government-compelled speech, the Court has been steadfast in its view that the
government cannot compel anyone to speak the government's message.'
Finally, as to expressive association, the Court has given
deferential treatment to groups and their decisions to exclude certain

individuals. 102
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

After dealing with two preliminary issues,' the Court in Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.' 4 addressed the

99.

100.

126 S.Ct. 1297 (2006).

See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.

101. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
102. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
103. Before discussing whether the Solomon Amendment violated the law schools' First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association, the Court dealt with two preliminary
issues: (1) "whether institutions can comply with the Solomon Amendment by applying a
general nondiscrimination policy to exclude military recruiters" and (2) whether Congress
exceeded "constitutional limitations on its power in enacting [the Solomon Amendment]."
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1305-07
(2006). As to the first issue, both parties agreed that the statute required that '[un order
for a law school and its university to receive federal funding, the law school [had to] offer
military recruiters the same access to its campus and students that it provide[d] to the
nonmilitary recruiter[s] [who] receiv[ed] the most favorable access." Id. at 1304. The Court

agreed with this interpretation and concluded that under the Solomon Amendment, it was
"insufficient for a law school to treat the military as it treats all other employers who
violate its nondiscrimination policy" and "military recruiters must be given the same access
as recruiters who comply with the [nondiscrimination] policy." Id. at 1306. As to the
second issue, the Court held that the Constitution explicitly gave Congress a "broad and
sweeping'" power to "'provide for the common Defence,'" which included the power to
"'raise and support Armies'" and to "provide and maintain a Navy." Id. (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). The Court reasoned that this power included "the authority to
require campus access for military recruiters." Id. The Court concluded that Congress's
decision should enjoy deference and that Congressional power to regulate military
recruiting was arguably greater under the Solomon Amendment "because universities are
free to decline the federal funds." Id.

104.

126 S.Ct. 1297 (2006).
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Third Circuit's responses to FAIR's First Amendment claims."' Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that as a general matter, the
Solomon Amendment regulated conduct and not speech, and because
Congress had the authority to require law schools to provide equal
access to military recruiters without violating their First Amendment
rights of speech and association, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional.° 6
A.

Compelled Speech

1. Government Compelled Speech. First, the Court addressed
the Third Circuit's conclusion that in supplying such services as sending
e-mails and distributing flyers for military recruiters, law schools were
unconstitutionally compelled to speak the government's message.' 7
The Court quickly recognized that elements of speech were present when
law schools provided the military with recruiting assistance.0 8 The
Court observed that prior precedent had established that "the principle
[of] freedom of speech prohibit[ed] the government from telling people
what they must say."'0 9 The Court reasoned that unlike Barnette and
Wooley, the Solomon Amendment did not "dictate the content of the
speech" and that any speech that was compelled was "plainly incidental
to the Solomon Amendment's regulation of conduct.""0
The Court
stated that compelling a law school to send e-mails on behalf of a
military recruiter was "simply not the same as forcing a student to
pledge allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah's Witness to display the motto
'Live Free or Die,'" as were the situations in Barnette and Wooley."'
Rejecting the Third Circuit's conclusion, the Court stated that FAIR's
argument trivialized these decisions and concluded that the services law
schools had to provide for military recruiters was not compelled
speech." 2
2. Government Compelled Accommodation of Speech. Next,
the Court addressed the Third Circuit's conclusion that because military
recruiters were speaking while they were on campus, law schools were

105. Id. at 1307.
106. Id. at 1313.
107. Id. at 1309.
108. Id. at 1308.
109. Id. In support of this principle, Chief Justice Roberts cited the decisions in
Barnette and Wooley. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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being unconstitutionally forced to permit, host, and accommodate their
message." 3 The Court started its analysis by distinguishing its line
of compelled speech cases where individuals were forced to speak the
government's message from those cases where the government forced
individuals "to host or accommodate another speaker's message."
The Court asserted that prior decisions had found compelled-speech
violations where "the complaining speaker's own message was affected
by the speech it was forced to accommodate.""' The Court reasoned
that when law schools are hosting interviews and recruiting receptions,
they are not speakers, but merely facilitators "to assist their students in
obtaining jobs.""' The Court concluded that a law school's recruiting
services lacked any "expressive quality."" 7 The Court held that the
"accommodation of a military recruiter's message is not compelled speech
because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any
message of the school.""' In passing, the Court made short shrift of
FAIR's argument that any similar treatment given to all recruiters
"could be viewed as sending the message that they see nothing wrong
with the military's policies, when they do."" 9 In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that there was nothing about recruiting on
campus that would suggest "law schools agree with any speech by
recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the
law schools may say about the military's policies." 2 °
B.

Expressive Conduct

After rejecting the contention that the Solomon Amendment violated
the freedom of speech, the Court addressed the Third Circuit's conclusion
that even if the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, the conduct was
expressive, and the regulation of it was an unconstitutional infringement
on the right to engage in expressive conduct. 2' First, the Court noted
the decisions in O'Brien and Johnson to support its conclusion that while
there were "some forms of 'symbolic speech' [that] were deserving of

113. Id. at 1307, 1309-10.
114. Id. at 1309.
115. Id. The Court referenced the decisions of Hurley, Pacific Gas, and Tornillo, which
the Third Circuit had relied upon. Id. The Court reasoned that these decisions were
distinguishable because a "law school's recruiting services lack[ed] the expressive quality
of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a newspaper." Id. at 1310.
116. Id. at 1309-10.
117. Id. at 1310.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1307, 1310-11.
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First Amendment protection," this protection would only apply to
"conduct that is inherently expressive."122 The Court stated that while
the decision in Johnson held that "burning the American flag was
sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection[,]" the
conduct that was being regulated by the Solomon Amendment was
not.123 Prior to the equal-access requirement of the newly amended
Solomon Amendment, the Court noted that law schools would "express"
their disagreement with the military "by treating military recruiters
differently from other recruiters." 2 4 The Court reasoned that the
expressive portion of a "law school's actions is not created by the conduct
itself but by the speech that accompanies it" and pointed out that this
conduct was only expressive because the law schools needed to explain
their conduct with speech.'25 Applying the O'Brien standard, the
Court concluded that there was only an "'incidental burden on speech"'
that was no greater than needed.'2 6 In determining whether there was
a "substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation," the Court held that there was a
substantial government interest in military recruiting because "raising
and supporting the Armed Forces ...would be achieved less effectively
if the military were forced to recruit on less favorable terms than other
employers."'27 The Court concluded that "even if the Solomon Amendment were regarded as regulating
expressive conduct, it would not
2
violate the First Amendment."1
C. Expressive Association
Finally, after concluding that there was no violation of the law schools'
freedom of speech, the Court then turned to the question of whether a
violation of freedom of expressive association had occurred. 129 The
Court noted that this was an important consideration because if the
government were allowed to "restrict individuals' ability to join together
and speak, it could essentially silence views that the First Amendment
is intended to protect." 30
Referencing Boy Scouts of America v.

122. Id. at 1310.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1311. The Court went on to state that "[i]f combining speech and conduct
were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform
conduct into 'speech' simply by talking about it." Id.
126. Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1311-13.
130. Id. at 1312.
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Dale,1"' the Court concluded that military recruiters and law schools
only "associate" in the context of their interaction." 2 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized that recruiters were not part of the law school, but
instead were "outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose
of trying to hire students-not to become members of the school's
expressive association." 33 The Court reasoned that this distinction was
"critical" because students and faculty were "free to associate to voice
their disapproval of the military's message," and because military
recruiters were outsiders, the Solomon Amendment does not affect "the
composition of the [law school] by making group membership less
desirable."'3 4 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Solomon
Amendment did not violate the law schools' right to associate, no matter
13 5
"how repugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message."
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The consequence of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. 36 is that military recruiters must be given the same
access as nonmilitary recruiters to students on university campuses. In
upholding the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, the Court's
holding clarified three First Amendment tangential freedom issues: (1)
what is and is not expressive conduct; (2) what constitutes compelled
speech; and (3) what is meant by expressive association.
First, as to what is and what is not expressive conduct, the Court
stated that only conduct that was "inherently expressive" was worthy of
protection under the First Amendment. 137 The Court discussed Texas
v. Johnson," where the Court held that flag burning deserved protection under the First Amendment because it was "sufficiently expressive. " "9 This seems to be a different formulation of the test for
expression than was stated in Johnson. There the Court said that
"whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative
elements" that would provide it with First Amendment protection
depended on the presence of "'[an intent to convey a particularized

131. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
132. Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1312.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1313.
135. Id.
136. 126 S.Ct. 1297 (2006).
137. Id. at 1310.
138. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
139. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1310 (citing
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406).
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message, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.'"'" In Johnson the Court cited
several instances of conduct that met this test of expression, including
"students[] wearing . .. black armbands to protest American military
involvement in Vietnam... a sit-in by blacks in a 'whites only' area to
protest segregation ... and ... picketing about a wide variety of
causes."141 The Court in Johnson also emphasized that it is "not
simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the
governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a
restriction on that expression is valid." 142 However, it does not seem
that the Court in Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.
followed this logic, as it appears the test for expression has changed to
a finding of "inherently expressive" conduct where the expression is
"'overwhelmingly apparent.'"'"3 What expressive conduct will meet
this qualification is unknown and is of great consequence to the future
of freedom of expression claims.
Second, as to what constitutes compelled speech, while making
reference to its decisions in Barnette and Wooley, the Court stated that
even if compelled speech is "plainly incidental" to a regulation of
conduct, it will be upheld.' Although this reaffirms previous decisions, it also has clarified that groups who control property and
resources will often not be found to be engaged in compelled speech.' 45
However, this may be problematic, as the Court does not distinguish
between public and private groups.
Finally, as to what is meant by expressive association, the Court
rejected the claim that the law schools' freedom of association allowed
them to exclude military recruiters.'" This seems contrary to the
Court's decision in Dale, where the Boy Scouts were allowed to exclude
a gay scoutmaster because the government interest did not justify
inclusion and "the forced inclusion ...would significantly affect [their]
expression. " 147 Because the Court in Dale gave deference to both an
association's "assertions regarding the nature of its expression," as well

140. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11
(1974)).
141. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966); Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983)).
142. Id. at 406-07.
143. Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1310-11.
144. Id. at 1308.
145. See id. at 1310.
146. Id. at 1312-13.
147. Id. at 1312 (quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-59 (2000)).
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as "to an association's view of what would impair its expression," the
Court in Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. seemingly
abandoned both of these considerations."4 Additionally, the Court did
not look for a government interest to justify inclusion as it did in Dale.
Chief Justice Roberts stated that "judicial deference ... is at its apogee"
when Congress legislates in the area of military affairs,149 but Chief
Justice Roberts did not make note of any evidence that the exclusion of
military recruiters was hurting military recruiting or national security.
In this new age of international terrorism, this narrowing of associational expression could be problematic for dissenting groups to war and
certain foreign affairs policies as the Court looks to give congressional
deference to the military in spite of First Amendment associational

rights.
BROOK BRISTOW

148. Dale, 530 U.S.'at 653.
149. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).

